

# EU-INDIA TT TWINNING INITIATIVE 2018

## Opening remarks

**Friederike Tschampa** made the opening remarks and also chaired the first session. She began by thanking all the participants and gave a brief introduction to the EU-India TT Twinning Initiative. It started in 2015. Referring to the Ambassador's statement the previous evening, she reiterated that the EU has already started picking up the recommendations made earlier in the first round of the twinning initiative. Accordingly, the EU has launched maritime security cooperation. The EU heeded quite carefully the suggestions on larger matters of concepts/ideas and ventured into more areas of practical cooperation. One important activity was a workshop on countering radicalisation in India in which security experts from the EU and police officers from 14 Indian states participated. She emphasised that in the evening event where high level policy makers would be there, the researchers should make practical recommendations to draw their attention. While the day long workshop is meant for mutual peer review of the papers, the evening event will be used to share research findings where the researchers should try to capture the opportunity by sharing what they are most interested to learn, i.e., practical recommendations for further cooperation and in deepening and broadening the partnership that already exists. The papers produced under the initiative had been clustered in different sessions based on similar focus.

## Session 1

The first paper was on "BRI initiative: European and Indian Perceptions" prepared and presented by Gulshan Sachdeva and Karine Lisbonne de Vergeron. The paper was based on a series of discussions with important stakeholders. The European perceptions of BRI launched by President Xi Jinping, has also evolved as it expanded geographical scope right up to Latin America. With this, China is seeking access to new markets, promoting Chinese technology internationally, and has also become an instrument for Chinese regional and global foreign policy. The project is highly ambitious and if China succeeds, it will alter relations all over Asia, Indian Ocean, and also globally.

Since the EU represents 15% of China's trade and China is second to US in EU trade accounting for 15% of EU exports, initial response from France, Germany and UK after the launch of BRI was to join AIIB in 2014. China engaged with member countries rather than EU. European position is about welcoming China's investment but also ensuring it is up to EU standards. It should be an open initiative and follow market rules. EU is not yet unified sufficiently to articulate common global foreign policy, and as a result China is able to play one country against another. 11 member states in Central and Eastern Europe have signed bilateral MoU with China on BRI. In addition, there is a framework for cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European countries in the 16+1 format.

For most European countries, the primary focus has been the direct economic interest with China than common European strategy. China gives specific importance to Greece for access to the Mediterranean. Level of interaction is different for different member states as there is divergent interest and business opportunities. It will create local competition as Southern countries will get more competitive. Most business is of course going to Chinese contractors. At present, there are three levels of cooperation: EU level, national and regional level and continuation with such arrangements can

lead to greater European concern. BRI could dilute political unity and create tension in member states. Clearly this has raised a range of issues in Central and Eastern Europe with respect to development.

So far, China has not committed much investment. What China has invested in Central and Eastern Europe is much less than what EU invested in just one country – Poland. There is much room for greater cooperation between European countries: 16+1 format. The EU should be proactive in promoting investments keeping in view the need for strategic investment and planning. German perception has evolved on BRI over the years. The same is true for France. The ability to succeed will depend on ensuring EU/international standards and norms, respect for IPR etc, and coordination between member states.

As BRI is evolving so is the Indian perception. In the last 6 years, it has become diverse. These perceptions, articulated by MEA briefings, TV commentary, media reports etc. are much more than the official narrative. At the beginning of debate on BRI itself in the context of Central Asia, India looked at BRI from the perspective of geopolitical and development implications for India. The same is reflected in Indian perception. Recently, the political economy aspect is figuring prominently. India is now evaluating it from a broader perspective including political, socio-economic, and environmental issues. This has been shaped by the experiences in neighbouring countries in the Indian Ocean region.

The biggest challenge for India is how to manage relations with China, particularly in the context of border dispute, Doklam, trade deficit etc., which are also influencing India's perception on BRI. Policy makers are clear: not even US can offset China's influence. Hence, the focus is on strengthening dialogue with ASEAN countries. The Government's position on BRI has been consistent since 2013. India neither fully rejected nor endorsed it. However, it is strongly opposed to the CPEC project. When India became member of SCO in 2017, there was an expectation that India would endorse BRI. But BRI was missing in the declaration due to Indian objection. Nevertheless, India is engaging with China in AIIB and other initiatives. India has participated and is the 2<sup>nd</sup> largest shareholder and largest concession recipient in AIIB. BCIM is an important component of BRI. In 2013, it graduated from track 2 to track 1. But later, BCIM became Chinese BRI which created problems.

Going beyond, what political parties are saying is not very different from the government position. The BJP position is very close to the government position. Congress has no official position, but some leaders are of the opinion that India should participate in BRI. CPI and others of course have a different take as they believe opposing the BRI is similar to the US policy of strategic containment of China. Concerns on Indian Ocean also overshadowed BRI narrative in India. Other stakeholders have varying opinion. While some are not averse to selective engagement, some are opposed to joining this as it will make India second class power, and force India to bow to the Chinese supremacy. Academic writing has highlighted sovereignty and security issues, but also has seen BRI as an opportunity for infrastructure investment. BRI, if integrated into its own connectivity plans, connectivity to Eurasia in particular, it will be helpful to India. Of late, in the last 1 year, there has been growing discontent in BRI participating countries. Indian standpoint has been wait and watch, and pursue own connectivity projects. Europe's focus was on developmental aspect, Indian policy makers are quite cautious from the very beginning. Wider Indian perspective is in favour of selective engagement. In this context, wider understanding through consultations on BRI could be the way forward.

The **second paper** of the session, "China's evolving BRI: India's and EU's perspective" was prepared and presented by Arvind Kumar, Malgorzata Bonikowska and Bogdan Goralczyk.

Country position vis-a-vis the BRI and the policy related to engagement with China has been changing. European politicians and media do not understand real essence of BRI, and the knowledge is superficial. The Chinese surprised the world with BRI. The Chinese want to formalise their domestic transformation which is a priority for them. We need to understand the Chinese civilisation. They are sceptical about anything foreign. BRI is a significant investment initiative of global scale that can be compared only with the Marshal Plan that was adopted after the Second World War.

There is better understanding of the BRI in India. BRI is mainly geo-strategic and geo-political project. If there is a development angle, it is development through Chinese glasses. One has to understand the global economic and investment context. Earlier EU was playing a big brother role, but now Chinese investment going out is bigger, and much of this investment is through merger and acquisition route. Security dimensions around Indian Ocean cannot be ignored.

In EU there is substantial difference of opinion. Some see this as an opportunity, some as a challenge, and some as even a threat. As underlined by the French President Macron, what is needed is balanced cooperation but what we see in BRI is unbalanced cooperation. EU prefers a multilateral approach but Chinese are pushing through unilateral and bilateral approaches. They are also focussing on the countries of communism heritage. China has got its first think tank abroad in Budapest last year with a branch of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Within the region of 16, at least 3 countries are eager to cooperate with China: Hungary, Serbia (supported by Balkans), and the Czech. Romania also seems to cooperate. In 2015, Poland was eager to cooperate, and it was among the first members of AIIB. But Poland is hesitant now, because of unpredictability on global scene, viewing through security glasses not economic. Poland needs NATO/American security.

At the last EU-China Summit meeting in July 2018, we went beyond trade. Foreign security cooperation, climate change, and clean energy were discussed. In many of these areas, China is doing the most and we can share. On the other hand, we have a problem of different culture as rules and standards are not clearly defined and followed and Chinese contractor are preferred. IPR is also a concern. For China, own knowledge and expertise get top priority – a strategy that it follows from the 19<sup>th</sup> century. They use western expertise as additional.

Motivation of China behind launching the BRI is very clear. It is to fill up the vacuum in the global geo-strategic space as the West seems to be withdrawing. Due to the decline of Western powers, China has also been successful in mobilising public opinion and provided leeway in intensifying Chinese efforts to be seen as a world leader. In its BRI forum in 2017, more than 200 countries participated. However, most did not understand financial feasibility and economic sustenance through connectivity. Connectivity project is now the hallmark of China's foreign policy. The BRI forum was used for demonstration of China's intent but how it would be implemented was hardly discussed at the forum. India has been opposing it for several reasons from the very beginning. The fact that India was neglected from the beginning is also a factor. If they had scripted BRI strategy in consultation with India, it would probably have been an active partner. China projecting China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as the hallmark and a showpiece of BRI has also irritated India as it believes that the corridor impinges on its sovereignty. Indian's opposition is well documented. Nevertheless, India can get on board if BRI adheres to international norms. Currently, BRI is not cognisant of other countries' sovereignty and integrity.

BRI is not the central theme in promoting bilateral relationship between India and China and BRI would not come in the way either, though it can be an irritant. Without India, it would be difficult for BRI to succeed, and China understands that. China has been trying to checkmate India in the region, and BRI is a part of China's geopolitical orientation. China is eclipsing India in South Asia.

Countries participated in the forum to understand whether the project will be sustainable and feasible. On sustainability, what is feeding into it needs to be understood. The project on paper is worth \$4Bn. Currently, developmental aspect is evolving. BRI is 5 years old, and the forum is just 1 year old. Some negative aspects have already come out. More will come out in the coming years. Sri Lankan government is reeling under debt. Nevertheless, we are seeing a shift of centre of gravity from west to east and both India and China would have to assume leadership role in the world affairs, they will have to come together to achieve the larger goal of global development and peace.

### Discussion

It was noted that it would be useful to further flesh out the variations in European perceptions, and to identify where the fault lines lie. It will also be useful to understand the perceptions beyond policy makers, and see how European businesses look at the BRI. It will also be interesting to know if BRI raises any security concerns in Europe. It was noted that business insights were included. It is not a positive one, and there are a lot of concerns among member states overall on standards and rules. As far as security dimensions are concerned, the EU position is still developing and it differs from country to country. There is enthusiasm in Hungary, Slovenia, Poland but not so much in Germany, France.

It also came out from the discussions that BRI could be a game changer but it is not yet so. It will create parallel institutional architecture and regime building. It has the potential to change global dynamics. In all debates in central/south Asia, most policy makers are excited about BRI, money coming directly to them. China prefers to deal unilaterally or bilaterally rather than multilaterally. In that sense multilateralism could be under threat. There is of course an irritant: the Trump factor. How it will be working is not clear as it is unpredictable. As for parallel institutional framework and architecture: China is creating it, diligently and slyly. Chinese cooperation is anti-NATO. India is a part of it. RCEP may be finalised by this year. In Chinese minds, it will replace TPP. China seems to be working for a new security system for Asian countries by the Asians.

We see more and more asymmetric approach by countries outside the mainstream. The same is true for Russia also, not just China. To EU, the problem is not just China but also Trump and other factors. Earlier the US approach was different. Hence for EU, it is like losing the big brother. Now it mixes European values and interests with respect to China. China wants Europeans to think that BRI is an economy project and they know that by using economy, infrastructure project narrative is positive for the EU. But the EU is divided among member states. When China does business with others, its Communist Party is on top. Not so for Europe. Former Poland PM did not talk to China about human rights as Poland wants to do business with China. Now Europeans are starting to avoid these kinds of discussions with China for business. To add one more country for the whole picture: India-China relations are similar as Europe-Russia relations.

Assessment is, there may be geopolitical dimensions, but success will depend on whether it is economically sustainable. China alone will not be able to pump in all the investment. There are

challenges and it should not be seen as a success before it is. Five years is not too long a period. Downside has started coming out rather soon. Sri Lankan project was important and it had approached everyone then but only China stepped in. Now the whole port has been leased out for 99 years. BRI is going to be unilateral as funding from Chinese companies not BRI members. If China can recognise sovereignty, then it will be useful.

Whether or not you are with BRI, you will be affected. In that sense, dialogue with all major partners including the EU is important – convergence will happen, not just on BRI but on broader connectivity issues. Both China and EU have a history of connectivity projects. India can benefit from BRI in central Asia. If a large Indian conglomerate decides to invest in BRI, the government will not be able to stop it. Private sector links should be prioritised. Chinese friendly links should be brought out. In the end, business will determine if BRI is remunerative. Business opinions are important.

If we are saying BRI is a concern, then how India-EU can cooperate is important, and also if considered an opportunity then how the three can work together also needs to be explored. EU may not understand the security concerns of India fully as it is located far away from China. For EU the question of standards and norms is important, so is the case for social/environmental issues. This is also the message from India since beginning, in terms of how connectivity develops. We need to explore if there is room for evolving standards. Communication is also important. Is China offering media the right stories or is it controlling the narrative. Questioning of the terms being used by the players is also important. We need to find strategic dimension and analysis of European position. Between India-EU, connectivity dimension and respect for norms will be the key. The EU recognises human rights as also very important. These findings need to be turned into clear recommendations.

## Session 2

*The first paper in the session was “Europe in Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC): EU-Asia, EU-India and EU-Japan Cooperation Ahead of China’s BRI”, prepared by Maaïke Okano-Heijmans and Jagannath Panda, and presented by Jagannath Panda.*

The paper addresses how connectivity can be a medium of cooperation between India and EU at the continental level. Currently, there is a gap and we need a broad continental framework. In the last 5-7 years, most impressive connectivity projects are the Chinese ones. OBOR was a political proposition and when Chinese understood that its acceptability will be a problem, they changed the name to BRI. Chinese Premier has amended constitution and he will serve for at least 3 terms. BRI is closely linked with the fortune of Chinese political party, economic strategy and the National Development Plan of China. We should be concerned. There is high degree of like-mindedness between EU and India. For EU-India, rule of law, political order, democracy etc. are important.

There are competing connectivity models. Japan in 2015-16 initiated PQI (Partnership for Quality Infrastructure), and then renamed it as EPQI (Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure). Japan’s foreign policy has always been reactive. Then Asia Africa Growth Corridor has been proposed by the PMs of India and Japan last year. It has focus on infrastructure and development. The main point of divergence between the Chinese approach and that of others is that the Chinese are taking unilateral initiatives, all the others (EU-India-Japan) talk about universal aspects. Also, there is divergence in terms of operational aspects as well as debt trap diplomacy questions. Other connectivity models give importance to human developmental aspects and they are people centric.

BRI may also claim so but the Chinese have never taken them into consideration. The EU has been talking about sustainable connectivity. Development is also the core concern of AAGC.

India and EU have good relations but now when they need each other, they are not talking about trilateral or multilateral approach. If we take Trump's approach, the EU needs to play a more important role and needs new partners, and India and Japan could be the right candidates. In Asia, the EU's approach so far has been China centric. There is need for course correction now. The India-EU joint statement released in 2017, mentioned trade and economic cooperation after political issues. However, core of this relation should be more of economic. Should BRI be a point of contention between India and EU? Most richer countries find it competing and are opposing it, however, smaller countries are supporting it. In Asia, India and Japan are important for the EU to engage with. Japan's foreign policy has significant Indian Ocean component. Their investment in India is also significant. They are aiming to cooperate with EU, have expanded partnership and EU must capitalise on that.

India-EU-Japan can evolve a framework of trilateral cooperation. Chinese are not a member of IORA but pouring money into Indian Ocean region. EU needs to play a role here. In other fora like SAARC too, EU can play a role and help the region develop BBIN corridor. Cooperation can include climate change, irrigation etc. EU can contribute to International Solar Alliance. It can also contribute to water initiatives, and naval, security issues including cooperation with QUAD. Japan has been investing a lot in the North East region of India. India puts restriction on foreign investment in this part of the country for security reasons but Japan has been an exception. Japanese position on sustainable connectivity is open and transparent. Japan's position on Arunachal is not clear, yet they supported India on the Doklam issue. EU can also complement the Japanese efforts in the region.

The **second paper** in the session was on "Charting EU-India Cooperation on Connectivity" prepared by Darshana Barua and Garima Mohan and presented by Garima Mohan.

EU and India need to explore how to operationalize the cooperation beyond BRI. EU has defined connectivity as creation of transport links including in land, sea, and air, as well as digital, energy and people-to-people connectivity. India has not defined connectivity but growth and connectivity are now central to Indian foreign policy thinking. India shares the international community's desire for enhancing physical as well as softer forms of connectivity.

The EU has been investing in energy grids, transport links, and people-to-people connectivity in South Asia. India has grand plans for its neighbourhood but offers limited development assistance due to its own limited resources. India is looking at Myanmar, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka where it wants to develop alternative multimodal connectivity including roads, railways, maritime and inland water. While BRI comes with hard cash, Indian projects come with softer aspects. India is looking for third partner as it faces problem of resources. This opens the possibility of partnership with EU and Japan.

Europe's investments in SA connectivity projects are largely soft connectivity projects. Apart from physical networks, it is helping develop institutional rules and practices. It also aims at providing more alternatives to developing countries on sustainable project financing. European connectivity related projects are in energy, infra, ICT, and transport sectors. EU-India can develop a common framework. Regional connectivity is an area of potential convergence for EU and India. Regional connectivity is not just a Chinese idea, India too has been working on it, often as a response to China. Normative convergence between India and EU can follow level playing field, standard etc. But one should not underestimate the areas of divergence: delays in land acquisition, bureaucratic hassles, and lack of

discipline among the project consultants, changes in project design and changes that often occur due to political changes.

China led AIIB and BRI are trying to fill the infrastructure void. But these projects are marred by lack of transparency, poor environmental and labour rights records and contempt for internationally recognized norms and rules. The EU has tremendous scope for working together in connectivity projects. India-EU cooperation is possible in infrastructure projects with third countries particularly in South Asia and South East Asia. India can also gain from the EU's experience of implementing projects in its own neighbourhood. India-EU cooperation can extend to soft infrastructure, as well as building capacities on blue economy (Mauritius, Seychelles, Sri Lanka). There is of course enough scope for cooperation on connectivity within India (energy grids, transport etc). The EU should clearly articulate the scope and form of partnership with India in its new strategy including the role of EU in Asia, relation with Japan etc. It also needs to clarify funding, role of member states. Organising dialogues and formation of working groups on connectivity could be important steps. Both India and the EU have to go beyond criticism of BRI.

### Discussion

If BRI has the objective of moulding and shaping in globalised world, then other players should do more than just criticising it. Talking of Indian's designs of connectivity, especially EU and international corridors are missing. India has not taken much interest on longstanding project of India going up to Europe (North-South Corridor – important players: Russia and Iran). Interestingly, Russia is also working closely on BRI. EU already has a strong connectivity dialogue with China, but it is not clear how to factor that into EU-India partnership. In the North-South International Corridor, we are yet to identify projects where EU-India can cooperate. Apart from, North-South, the EU can also join East-West corridor, pipelines, as well as port management projects.

Question was raised if it would be feasible for EU to join Quad. It was pointed out that EU has reservation about joining initiatives in the Indo-Pacific as it does not want to take a position against China. However, it was emphasised that course correction needs to be done among quad members, which does not mean being anti-China. Indo-Pacific is not a strategic initiative. Quad countries do not have direct confrontation with China but doing something on their own will level out China's influence. Areas of quad where EU can play role are: climate change, infrastructure, connectivity, maritime security and maritime economic cooperation. EU can play strong role in IORA as well and take part in non-traditional security threats initiatives. On Asia Africa Growth Corridor, it is the opportune time for EU to talk to India and Japan. EU can play a role, particularly in the areas of education, agriculture, irrigation, climate change, and forest management.

### Session 3

*The third session had only one paper titled, "East Africa, India and Europe – norms to supercharge Indian Ocean commerce" prepared and presented by Mihir Sharma and Tuneer Mukherjee.*

The paper analyses trade in commodities between India and 8 African countries (IOA8). The 8 countries selected for this study are all littoral countries of the Indian Ocean. Africa is poised for economic take off driven by its youth bulge and the prospects for internal and external trade. Among these countries

only Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique have relatively stronger trade relations with India. Even Mauritius has relatively good volume of trade with India considering its size. All these countries also have close political ties with India. However, Indian exports to these countries are showing a declining trend. Major export item from India to these countries is mineral fuels but its share has also declined over the recent years. Pharmaceuticals and heavy industry are the other important items. Interestingly, India imports mostly from Tanzania and Mozambique and its imports from other countries are relatively small. Major import items are minerals and jewellery and precious stones. India also imported vegetables. Indian imports from these countries have been rather stagnant. India has been investing a lot in these countries but we do not have adequate data on investment figures.

EU exports to these countries are more or less stagnant and the major items are heavy industry and electrical machinery. EU imports from these countries have also remained stagnant in recent years with major items being base metals and ores and seafood. Kenya, Madagascar, and Mozambique are key trade partners to EU. European trade is steady with Eastern Africa, but Indian trade has fluctuated because of actual volumes of commodities traded. When pulses price go up, India imports more from east Africa. East Africa complains of no steady trade presence here and vice versa. Therefore, there is good ground to create hard infrastructure cooperation; it would need some kind of catalytic event.

Island nations have most potential for EU-India cooperation. Seychelles and Mauritius have good relations with both India and Europe. The cooperation can operate at three levels. EU-India can build trade infrastructure in the region. EAC operates five modes of transport systems. India-EU can support EAC. At the second level, EU-India can help the region develop governance system, health infrastructure and regional development. They can also support the region in setting norms regarding open, transparent economic environment with rules and standards.

### Discussion

Several specific areas of cooperation were suggested in the discussion. Suggestion was sought on how can EU-India support African nations to come out of just being supplier of commodities. Eastern Africa does not have the same restrictions as elsewhere and also lacks hard infrastructure. Affordable and end-user determined infrastructure investment could be vital area of cooperation between India-EU. Between India and IOA8 soft infrastructure is a major area of cooperation such as fibre optic cables. The focus of Indian overseas effort on governance could be digital-identity based governance in which India has achieved substantial success. The way technology is shaping up in Africa, startups are creating linkages between old African nations/economies. Technology is creating norms not just in trade/commerce but also in society. When Africa grows, norms for technology will be important. Traditional norms will need to be changed.

Africa is entering the age of PPPs. In the last 5-6 years, for India a lot of engagement came from creating soft infrastructure – governance mechanism and digital infra. Auditing of PPPs, renegotiations of relations, passing on legal/contractual knowledge based on PPP designs. It is important to help create norms for public-private engagement. One way to clean up investment sector in Africa is working on auditing capacity and knowhow. To start at the lower level, Auditors from EU & CAG of India could conduct certain exercises in Africa. Auditing of PP partners is required and norm creation for such partnerships is a must.

Question was raised on what kind of EU-India cooperation should be looked at- should it be sub-regional or regional approach. More clarity is required for strategic and economic convergence. There is also a need to explore how India and EU would benefit from such a partnership. Maritime security is a key dimension and many Indian navy exercises are on-going. Anti-piracy has been a great success. Indian diaspora in both Seychelles and Mauritius is also a point of convergence. With India's support and France's buy-in, Seychelles and Mauritius can become important players in Indian Ocean region. With Brexit, India is looking at Germany and France as partners. It is developing and not very clear from what perspective France will support this. Indian Ocean Commission is EU funded. This can be a building block. When you are talking about engaging with a third country, that country should want that engagement/dialogue as well. When it comes to economic cooperation, EU sticks as an integrated entity, not individual member states. This is a bloc that can mobilise diversified commodity and help supercharge the commerce.

On the way of cooperation, one of scope of discussion is in investment/development of downstream medical care. India is going through process of creating healthcare start-ups which do not require last mile infrastructure. Presence of telecom operators in the area enables to shift learning from one sector to another. Hence, creating similar norms about rules that govern regulations of pharmaceuticals, anti-counterfeiting efforts could be useful. There is a scope for discussion on how to help investment in downstream medical care.

Commerce ministries from WTO's side are overstressed on trade policies especially fish from Madagascar and Seychelles. Africa needs support in building capacity on sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards and related infrastructure. Skill development is an important aspect. Africa is going to be the region which will drive world growth. East Africa is leading the process as these countries have shown consistent growth performance. As east Africa becomes more integrated, then Chinese investments will make a difference. Eastern Africa is becoming a hub for Asian market. It is important that India-Europe talk to each other on what norms are applied to trade/investment in that area. First mode of cooperation must either be through joint SPVs, and then through a combined approach from developmental agencies.

The issue of BRI also came back towards the end. It was observed that China is looking beyond largely for exporting the surplus particularly in steel and cement industries. The urban-rural gap is also growing in China. While 7-8 coastal provinces in China are growing, other provinces are not doing as well. Even in these coastal states, not all regions are contributing as much to economy like Shanghai etc. Even in infrastructure, the roads made have not supplemented business gaps. BRI, in a sense, is also intended to close the gap. While it was mentioned that President Xi Jinping becoming the life-long president of China will give stability to the BRI as he takes personal interest in the project, it was also pointed out that such a long rule by one person can make one country quite unstable in the long run as there is likely to be growing dissent.

### **Some General Suggestions**

It was expressed that cross fertilisation of ideas is expected out of this and fine tuning of research areas is needed. A need was felt to further review the papers as the papers were not circulated well in advance and hence comments on papers were primarily based on the presentations made rather than the entire paper. It was suggested that in future, designating one or two researchers as discussants will be useful. It was noted that the workshop was useful for TTs not based in Delhi, so

that there is no duplication of research. Need for exploring some ideas for next round of papers was also expressed.

It was suggested that the papers should be put together for a publication/book. Papers can also be disseminated through institutional website or through journals. It was clarified that the authors are free to publish them in appropriate journals.